1st. A new arrangement of the judicial districts, so as to make them more nearly equal in population, and thereby equalize the

duties to be performed by the judges.

2nd. The appointment of a chief judge and one associate judge to each judicial district: the associate judge to have exclusive equity jurisdiction in all equity cases arising within the district; and the chief judge to attend the court of appeals.

3rd. A Court of Appeals to be composed of the chief judges of

each judicial district.

4th. The abolishment of the office of Chancellor.

5th. The organization of a municipal court for the city of Baltimore, to have exclusive criminal jurisdiction, within said city, and to be composed of a chief judge and the Mayor of the city for the time being, who shall be the associate judge of said court.

The committee propose that the following salaries be allowed:

To the chief judges of the six judicial districts \$2,200

\$13,200each, 10,800To the associate judges of do. \$1,800, each, To the chief judge of the Municipal court of Baltimore, 2,000

\$26,000 Total salaries to be allowed,

The committee are of the opinion that the system here proposed. would be at least equal in efficiency to the present one; and it will be seen that the annual saving of expense, in the compensation paid to the Chancellor and Judges, will be fifteen thousand five hundred dollars per annum.

The committee were further instructed to enquire, "whether any, and if so, what change in the tenure of 'judicial office in this

State is expedient?

The constitution (as amended by the act of 1804, chapter 55)

declares:

"Each judge shall hold his commission during good behaviour. removable for misbeliaviour, on conviction in a court of law, or shall be removed by the Governor, upon the address of the General Assembly, provided, that two-thirds of all the members of each House concur in such address." The committee do not think that any change in the tenure of judicial office thus established by the constitution desirable or expedient. To alter this tenure, and to make the ministers of justice the creatures of executive patronage, or the periodical supplicants for popular favor, would be to destroy at once that independence, so necessary to form the character of the upright judge and faithful guardian of the rights of the people. mine of justice should be preserved unsullied from the touch of unholy hands. Her ministers should not only be pure, but above suspicion. They should stand alike unaffected by the turmoils of party strife, and unapproachable by the seductive influences of executive power.

Besides, gentlemen of high professional attainments, could not be induced to abandon a lucrative practice for the honor of a mere temporary elevation to the bench. They could only be induced to